

Message Text

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FM USDEL SECRETARY IN LOS ANGELES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 11 SECTO 02002

EXDIS
FOR EAGLEBURGER AND LORD ONLY

10. AT THE SAME TIME, THE CENTRAL CHARACTER OF MORAL VALUES
IN AMERICAN LIFE ALWAYS MADE US ACUTELY SENSITIVE TO THE
PURITY OF MEANS --AND WHEN WE DISPOSED OF OVERWHELMING POWER
WE HAD A GREAT LUXURY OF CHOICE. OUR MORAL CERTAINTY MADE
COMPROMISE DIFFICULT; OUR PREPONDERANCE OFTEN MADE IT UNNECESSARY.

11. TODAY, WHILE WE STILL HAVE MASSIVE STRENGTH, WE NO LONGER
ENJOY MEANINGFUL NUCLEAR SUPREMACY. WE REMAIN THE WORLD'S
MOST PRODUCTIVE AND INNOVATIVE ECONOMY, BUT WE MUST
NOW SHARE LEADERSHIP WITH WESTERN EUROPE, CANADA, AND
JAPAN; WE MUST DEAL WITH THE NEWLY WEALTHY AND DEVELOPING
NATIONS, AND WE MUST MAKE NEW CHOICES REGARDING OUR
ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. OUR
DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES ARE STILL FAR MORE VALUED BY THE
WORLD'S MILLIONS THAN WE REALIZE, BUT WE MUST ALSO COMPETE
WITH NEW IDEOLOGIES WHICH ASSERT PROGRESSIVE GOALS BUT PURSUE
THEM BY OPPRESSIVE METHODS.

12. TODAY, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OUR HISTORY, WE FACE
THE STARKE REALITY THAT THE CHALLENGE IS UNENDING; THAT
THERE IS NO EASY AND SURELY NO FINAL ANSWER; THAT THERE
ARE NO AUTOMATIC SOLUTIONS. WE MUST LEARN TO CONDUCT
FOREIGN POLICY AS OTHER NATIONS HAVE HAD TO CONDUCT IT
FOR SO MANY CENTURIES--WITHOUT ESCAPE AND WITHOUT RESPITE,
KNOWING THAT WHAT IS ATTAINABLE FALLS SHORT OF THE IDEAL, MANFUL
OF THE NECESSITIES OF SELF-PRESERVATIONS, CONSCIOUS THAT THE
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REACH OF OUR NATIONAL PURPOSE HAS ITS LIMITS. THIS IS A NEW EXPERIENCE FOR AMERICANS; IT PROMPTS NOSTALGIA FOR A SIMPLER PAST. AS IN THE PAST IT GENERATES THE SEARCH FOR SCAPEGOATS, HOLDING SPECIFIC POLICIES RESPONSIBLE FOR OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS THAT NO POLICY ON OUR PART COULD AVOID.

13. IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE WE NO LONGER PREDOMINATE BUT MUST PURSUE A LONG-TERM COURSE THAT THERE IS A PREMIUM ON OUR CONSTANCY AND PURPOSEFULNESS. WE CANNOT AFFORD TO SWING RECKLESSLY BETWEEN CONFRONTATION AND ABDICATION. WE MUST NOT EQUATE TOUGH RHETORIC WITH STRONG ACTION; NOR CAN WE WISH AWAY TOUGH REALITIES WITH NOSTALGIC HOPES. WE CAN NO LONGER ACT AS IF WE ENGAGE OURSELVES IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS ONLY WHEN WE CHOOSE, OR ONLY TO OVERCOME SPECIFIC PROBLEMS, SO THAT WE CAN THEN SHIFT OUR PRIORITIES BACK TO OUR NATURAL CONCERN WITH OURSELVES. THE REALITY IS THAT THERE CAN BE NO SECURITY WITHOUT OUR VIGILANCE AND NO PROGRESS WITH OUR DEDICATION.

14. IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT U.S.- SOVIET RELATIONS MUST BE SEEN.

THE CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGE OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS

15. THE ISSUE OF HOW TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN A CENTRAL FEATURE OF AMERICAN POLICY FOR THREE DECADES. WHAT IS NEW TODAY IS THE CULMINATION OF THIRTY YEARS OF POST WAR GROWTH OF SOVIET INDUSTRIAL, TECHNOLOGICAL AND MILITARY POWER. NO AMERICAN POLICY CAUSED THIS; NO AMERICAN POLICY COULD HAVE PREVENTED IT. BUT AMERICAN POLICY CAN KEEP THIS POWER FROM BEING USED TO EXPAND SOVIET INFLUENCE TO OUR DETRIMENT; WE HAVE THE CAPACITY TO ENABLE ALLIES AND FRIENDS TO LIVE WITH A SENSE OF SECURITY; WE CAN USE OUR ASSETS TO ADVANCE THE PROCESS OF BUILDING AN INTERNATIONAL ORDER OF COOPERATION AND PROGRESS.

16. WE MUST DO SO, HOWEVER, IN UNPRECEDENTED CONDITIONS. IN PREVIOUS PERIODS, RIVALRY BETWEEN MAJOR POWERS HAS ALMOST INVARIABLY LED TO WAR. IN OUR TIME, WHEN THERMONUCLEAR WEAPONS THREATEN CASUALTIES IN THE HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS, SUCH AN OUTCOME IS UNTHINKABLE. WE MUST MANAGE A FUNDAMENTAL CLASH OF
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IDEOLOGIES AND HARNESS THE RIVALRY OF THE NUCLEAR SUPERPOWERS, FIRST INTO COEXISTENCE, AND THEN MOLD COEXISTENCE INTO A MORE POSITIVE AND COOPERATIVE FUTURE. FOR AS PRESIDENT KENNEDY ONCE SAID, " IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS OUR MOST BASIC COMMON LINK IS THAT WE ALL INHABIT THIS SMALL PLANE. WE ALL BREATHE THE SAME AIR. WE ALL CHERISH OUR CHILDREN'S FUTURE. AND WE ARE ALL MORTAL."

17. IN THE PERIOD AFTER WORLD WAR II, OUR NIGHTMARE WAS THAT THE SOVIET UNION, AFTER CONSOLIDATING ITS OCCUPATION OF EASTERN EUROPE

MIGHT SEEK TO SPREAD ITS CONTROL TO OTHER CONTIGUOUS AREAS IN EUROPE AND ASIA. OUR POLICIES THEREFORE SOUGHT TO BUILDING ALLIANCES AND POSITIONS

OF MILITARY STRENGTH FROM WHICH WE COULD CONTAIN AND ISOLATE THE SOVIET UNION. IN THIS MANNER THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT BE FORCED TO SETTLE FOR PEACE; TRANSFORMATIONS MIGHT OCCUR WITHIN SOVIET SOCIETY THAT WOULD CURB EXPANSIONIST TENDENCIES AND MAKE THE USSR OVER TIME INTO A MORE COOPERATIVE PARTICIPANT IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 11 SECTO 02002

EXDIS

FOR EAGLEBURGER AND LORD ONLY

18. THESE POLICIES SERVED US AND OUR ALLIES WELL. SOVIET EXPANSION WAS CHECKED. BEHIND OUR SHIELD OF SECURITY AND WITH OUR ASSISTANCE, OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN WESTERN EUROPE RESTORED THEIR ECONOMIES AND REBUILT THEIR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS.

19. YET THE HOPE THAT THESE POLICIES WOULD PRODUCE PERMANENT STABILITY, POSITIVE EVOLUTION OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM, AND GREATER NORMALITY, WAS ONLY PARTIALLY REALIZED. IN THE IMMEDIATE POST WAR PERIOD, THE AGGRESSIVENESS OF SOVIET IDEOLOGY IN THE STALINIST ERA OBSCURED SOME OF THE REAL WEAKNESSES OF THE SOVIET STATE. INDEED, AS LATE AS 1962 DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, THE UNITED STATES ENJOYED A FIVE-TO-ONE SUPERIORITY IN STRATEGIC MISSILES, A THREE-TO-ONE

SUPERIORITY IN STRATEGIC BOMBERS, TOTAL NAVAL SUPERIORITY
EVERYWHERE, AND ROUGH EQUALITY ON THE GROUND IN EUROPE.

20. GRADUALLY WITH THE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM THROUGH
DECOLONIZATION, THE SOVIET UNION BEGAN TO EMERGE AS A FIRST-
CLASS MILITARY POWER.

21. IN STRATEGIC MILITARY TERMS THE USSR HAS ACHIEVED A BROAD
EQUALITY WITH THE UNITED STATES, AS WAS INEVITABLE FOR A NATION
WHOSE RULERS WERE PREPARED TO IMPOSE GREAT SACRIFICES ON
THEIR PEOPLE AND TO GIVE MILITARY STRENGTH THE ABSOLUTE TOP
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PRIORITY IN RESOURCES -- WITH ONLY HALF OF OUR GROSS NATIONAL
PRODUCT, SOVIET MILITARY EXPENDITURES EXCEED THOSE OF THE
UNITED STATES.

22. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HISTROY THE SOVIET UNION CAN
THREATEN DISTANT PLACES BEYOND THE EURASIAN LAND-MASS --
INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES. WITH NO PART OF THE WORLD
OUTSIDE THE RANGE OF ITS MILITARY FORCES, THE USSR HAS
BEGUN TO DEFINE ITS INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN GLOBAL TERMS
FOR THE FIRST TIME IN RUSSIAN HISTORY. SOVIET DIPLOMACY
HAS THRUST INTO THE MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA AND ASIA. THIS
EVOLUTION IS NOW ROOTED IN REAL POWER RATHER THAN A
RHETORICAL MANIFESTATION OF A UNIVERSALIST DOCTRINE WHICH
IN FACT HAS VERY LITTLE VALIDITY OR APPEAL.

23. COPING WITH THE IMPLICATIONS THIS EMERGING SUPERPOWER HAS
BEEN OUR CENTRAL SECURITY PROBLEM FOR THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS.
THIS CONDITION WAS NOT CAUSED BY AMERICAN POLICY; IT COULD
NOT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED BY AMERICAN POLICY, UNLESS BY
LAUNCHING A NUCLEAR WAR. IT WILL NOT GO AWAY, AND IT WILL PERHAPS
NEVER BE CONCLUSIVELY "SOLVED". IT WILL HAVE TO BE FACED BY
EVERY ADMINISTRATION FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

24. OUR POLICY MUST DEAL WITH THE CONSEQUENCES. THE
EMERGENCE OF AMBITIOUS NEW POWERS INTO AN EXISTING
INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURE IS A RECURRENT PHENOMENON.
HISTORICALLY, THE ADJUSTMENT OF AN EXISTING ORDER TO THE
ARRIVAL OF ONE OR MORE NEW ACTORS ALMOST INVARIABLY
WAS ACCOMPANIED BY WAR -- TO IMPEDE THE UPSTART, TO
REMOVE OR DIMINISH SOME OF THE PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED
ACTORS, TO TEST THE BALANCE OF FORCES IN A REVISED SYSTEM.
BUT IN THE NUCLEAR ERA, WHEN CASUALTIES IN A GENERAL NUCLEAR
WAR WILL INVOLVE HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS IN A MATTER OF DAYS,
THE USE OF FORCE THREATENS UTTER CATASTROPHE. IT IS OUR
RESPONSIBILITY TO CONTAIN SOVIET POWER WITHOUT GLOBAL WAR,
TO AVOID BOTH ABDICATION AS WELL AS CONFRONTATION.

25. THIS REQUIRES A DELICATE AND COMPLEX POLICY. WE
NEED AN EQUILIBRIUM OF POWER BUT WE MUST MOVE BEYOND IT
TO DEVELOP MUTUAL HABITS OF RESTRAINT, COEXISTENCE AND
ULTIMATELY, COOPERATION. WE MUST STABILIZE A NEW INTERNATIONAL
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ORDER IN A VASTLY DANGEROUS ENVIRONMENT, BUT OUR ULTIMATE
GOAL MUST BE TO TRANSFORM IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT INTO
CONSTRUCTIVE PARTICIPATION IN BUILDING A BETTER WORLD.

26. THIS IS WHAT IS MEANT BY THE PROCESS CALLED "DETENTE"
-- NOT THE HUNGER FOR RELAXATION OF TENSION, NOT THE STRIVING
FOR AGREEMENTS AT ANY PRICE, NOT THE MINDLESS SEARCH FOR
FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE WHICH SOME CRITICS USE AS NAIVE AND
DANGEROUS CARICATURES.

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EXDIS

FOR EAGLEBURGER AND LORD ONLY

27. THE POLICIES PURSUED BY THIS ADMINISTRATION HAVE
BEEN DESIGNED TO PREVENT SOVIET EXPANSION, BUT ALSO TO BUILD
A PATTERN OF RELATIONS IN WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WILL ALWAYS
CONFRONT PENALTIES FOR AGRESSION, AND ALSO ACQUIRE GROWING
INVENTIVES FOR RESTRAINT. THESE GOALS ARE ATTAINABLE, FOR
SOVIET POWER IS EVOLVING WITH CONSIDERABL UNEVENNESS.

SOVIET SOCIETY IS NO LONGER TOTALLY CUT OFF FROM CONTACT WITH AND THE INFLUENCES OF THE WORLD AROUND IT NOR IS IT WITHOUT ITS OWN NEEDS FOR OUTSIDE RELATIONSHIPS. ITS RIGIDITY AND PERVERSIVE CONSERVATISM ARE CLEARLY A BRAKE ON ITS GROWTH INTO A TECHNOLOGICALLY ADVANCED AND INNOVATIVE SOCIETY. IT IS THE GREAT INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES, NOT THE SOVIET UNION, THAT ARE THE ENGINE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY AND THE MOST PROMISING PARTNERS FOR THE POORER NATIONS. THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES, IF THEY FACE THEIR CHALLENGES WITH CONFIDENCE -- IF THEY DO NOT MESMERIZE THEMSELVES WITH THE ILLUSION OF SIMPLE SOLUTIONS -- POSSESS VAST STRENGTHS TO KEEP SOVIET POWER FROM BECOMING DOMINANT AND INFLUENCE THE MANNER IN WHICH IT IS USED INTO CONSTRUCTIVE DIRECTIONS.

28. OUR ESSENTIAL TASK IS TO RECOGNIZE THE NEED FOR A TWO PRONGED POLICY THAT SIMULTANEOUSLY AND WITH EQUAL VIGOR CURBS EXPANSIONIST DRIVES WHILE SEEKING TO SHAPE A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP. WE MUST PREVENT THE SOVIET UNION FROM TRANSLATING ITS GROWING STRENGTH INTO GLOBAL OR REGIONAL PREPONDERANCE. BUT WE MUST DO SO WITHOUT ESCALATING
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EVERY CRISIS INTO A MASSIVE CONFRONTATION. THE UNITED STATES HAS RESISTED AGGRESSIVE MOVES BY THE SOVIET UNION TO STABLISH A NAVAL BASE IN CUBA, TO IMPEDE THE ACCESS ROUTES TO BERLIN, TO EXPLOIT THE EXPLOSIVE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. RECENTLY WE HAVE SOUGHT TO HALT BLATANT INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA-- UNTIL PREVENTED FROM DOING SO BY CONGRESSIONAL ACTION.

29. AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE A HISTORIC OBLIGATION TO MANKIND TO ENGAGE THE SOVIET UNION IN NEGOTIATIONS ON CONCRETE PROBLEMS AND TO PUSH BACK THE SHADOW OF NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE. AT THE VERY LEAST WE OWE IT TO OUR PEOPLE TO DEMONSTRATE ITS GOVERNMENT HAS MISSED NO OPPORTUNITY TO ACHIEVE CONSTRUCTIVE SOLUTIONS AND THAT CRISES WHICH OCCUR WERE UNAVOIDABLE. FOR WHATEVER THE RHETORIC THE AMERICANS WILL NOT SUPPORT CONFRONTATIONS THEY CONSIDER CONTRIVED. THIS IS WHY THE UNITED STATES HAS SET FORTH PRINCIPLES OF RESPONSIBLE RELATIONS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE: RESPECT FOR THE INTERESTS OF ALL, RESTRAINT IN THE USES OF POWER, AND ABSENTION FROM EFFORTS TO EXPLOIT INSTABILITY OR LOCAL CONFLICTS FOR UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. THE UNITED STATES HAS SOUGHT TO GIVE LIFE TO THESE PRINCIPLES IN MAJOR NEGOTIATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL, THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTAL WAR, AND IN THE SETTLEMENT OF POLITICAL ISSUES SUCH AS BERLIN. AND WE HAVE BEGUN TO CONSTRUCT A NETWORK OF COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS IN A VARIETY OF FUNCTIONAL AREAS--ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC, MEDICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND OTHERS -- WHICH PROMISE CONCRETE BENEFITS IF POLITICAL CONDITIONS PERMIT THEIR FULL IMPLEMENTATION AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT. IT HAS BEEN OUR BELIEF THAT WITH

PATIENCE, A PATTERN OF RESTRAINTS AND A NETWORK OF VESTED INTERESTS CAN DEVELOP WHICH WILL GIVE COEXISTENCE A MORE HOPEFUL DIMENSION AND WHICH WOULD MAKE BOTH SIDES CONSCIOUS OF WHAT THEY WOULD STAND TO LOSE BY REVERTING TO THE POLITICS OF PRESSURE, CONFRONTATION AND CRISIS.

30. THIS POLICY HAS REPRESENTED THE DEEPEST ASPIRATIONS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. IN THE EARLY 1970'S WHEN CURRENT U.S. SOVIET RELATIONS WERE SHAPED, OUR NATION HAD ALREADY PASSED THROUGH TRAUMATIC EVENTS AND WAS ENGAGED IN AN ANGUISHING WAR. THERE WERE RIOTS IN THE STREETS AND ON THE CAMPUSES DEMANDING RAPID PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE. EVERY NEW DEFENSE PROGRAM WAS CHALLENGED -- INCLUDING

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THE ABM WHICH WAS APPROVED BY ONLY ONE VOTE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF MULTIPLE WARHEADS, THE TRIDENT SUBMARINE, AND THE B-1 BOMBER. SUCCESSIVE CONGRESSES PASSED RESOLUTIONS URGING THE ADMINISTRATION TO REORDER OUR NATIONAL PRIORITIES AWAY FROM DEFENSE. WE WERE CONTINUALLY ATTACKED FOR NOT MAKING CONCESSIONS IN THE SALT TALKS. THE CONGRESS AND MANY INTEREST GROUPS PRESSED CONTINUALLY FOR THE OPENING UP OF EAST-WEST TRADE AND AGITATED AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH OF LINKING PROGRESS IN ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH PRIOR PROGRESS IN POLITICAL RELATIONS. THROUGHOUT THE COURSE OF 1970 AND 1971, WE WERE INVOLVED IN A SERIES OF CRISES WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND WERE OFTEN ACCUSED OF PROVOCATION OR BELLICOSITY IN THE PROCESS.

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EXDIS

FOR EAGLEBURGER AND LORD ONLY

31. THUS ONLY A FEW SHORT YEARS AGO THE PRESSURES IN THIS COUNTRY AND FROM OUR ALLIES WERE OVERWHELMINGLY TO MOVE RAPIDLY TOWARD BETTER RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW. WE RESISTED THESE PRESSURES THEN, JUST AS WE NOW REFUSE TO LET OURSELVES BE STAMPEDED IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION. IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S VIEW THE COUNTRY NEEDS A BALANCED POLICY, COMBINING FIRMNESS AND CONCILIATION, STRONG DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL, POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES. AND IT MUST BE A POLICY FOR THE LONG TERM, THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE CAN SUSTAIN, OFFERING PROMISE OF A CONSTRUCTIVE FUTURE.

32. IT IS, THEREFORE, IRONIC THAT OUR NATIONAL DEBATE SEEMS NOW IN MANY RESPECTS TO HAVE COME FULL CIRCLE. THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH DETENTE ORIGINATED ARE LARGELY FORGOTTEN. THOSE WHO PRESSED FOR CONCESSIONS AND UNILATERAL RESTRAINT TOWARDS MOSCOW NOW ACCUSE THE GOVERNMENT OF BEING TOO CONCILIATORY. THOSE WHO COMPLAIN ABOUT OUR FAILURE TO RESPOND WITH SUFFICIENT VIGOR TO SOVIET MOVES ARE OFTEN THE VERY ONES WHO INCESSANTLY SEEK TO REMOVE THIS COUNTRY'S LEVERAGE FOR INFLUENCE OR ACTION -- THROUGH RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE AND CREDIT, THROUGH WEAKENING OUR INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES, THROUGH PREVENTING AID TO FRIENDS WHO SEEK TO RESIST SOVIET AGGRESSION.

33. THE RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE AND CREDIT ARE A CASE IN POINT. THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE IS A MATTER OF DEEP AND LEGITIMATE CONCERN TO ALL AMERICANS. BUT THE CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPT TO LINK IT OPENLY
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WITH ECONOMIC RELATIONS, WITHOUT SUBTLETY OR UNDERSTANDING OF SOVIET POLITICS BOTH DEPRIVED US OF ECONOMIC LEVERS AND SHARPLY REDUCED SOVIET EMIGRATION. OTHER INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES HAVE STEPPED IN TO PROVIDE CREDITS AND TECHNOLOGY, WITH LESS CONCERN FOR THE OBJECTIVE OF INDUCING POLITICAL RESTRAINT WHICH WE HAD ENVISAGED.

SO LET US UNDERSTAND THE SCOPE AND LIMITS OF A REALISTIC POLICY.

35. -- WE CANNOT PREVENT THE GROWTH OF SOVIET POWER, BUT WE CAN PREVENT ITS USE FOR UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE AND POLITICAL EXPANSION.

36. -- WE CANNOT PREVENT A BUILD-UP OF SOVIET FORCES BUT WE HAVE THE CAPACITY TOGETHER WITH OUR ALLIES TO MAINTAIN AN EQUILIBRIUM. WE CANNOT

NEGLECT THIS TASK AND THEN BLAME THE SOVIET UNION IF THE MILITARY BALANCE SHIFTS AGAINST US.

37. -- WE HAVE THE DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY CAPACITY TO RESIST EXPANSIONISM, BUT WE CANNOT ENGAGE IN A RHETORIC OF CONFRONTATION WHILE DEPRIVING OURSELVES OF THE MEANS TO CONFRONT.

38. -- WE MUST ACCEPT THAT SOVEREIGN STATES, ESPECIALLY OF ROUGHLY EQUAL POWER, CANNOT IMPOSE UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS ON EACH OTHER AND MUST PROCEED BY COMPROMISE.

39. -- WE MUST LIVE WITH THE REALITY OF THE NUCLEAR THREAT BUT WE HAVE IT IN OUR POWER TO BUILD A NEW RELATIONSHIP THAT TRANSCENDS THE NUCLEAR PERIL.

40. SO LET US END THE DEFEATIST RHETORIC THAT IMPLIES THAT SOVIET POLICY IS MASTERFUL, PURPOSEFUL AND OVERWHELMING WHILE AMERICAN POLICY IS BUMBLING, UNCERTAIN AND WEAK. WE HAVE A DESIGN AND THE MATERIAL ASSETS TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIET UNION. WE WILL SUCCEED IF WE MOVE FORWARD AS A UNITED PEOPLE.

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41. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND LET ME DISCUSS TWO CURRENT ISSUES THAT ILLUSTRATE THE TWO STRANDS OF POLICY THAT WE ARE CONCURRENTLY PURSUING:

42. -- THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS IN WHICH WE ARE SEEKING TO SHAPE A MORE POSITIVE FUTURE.

43. -- THE ANGOLAN SITUATION, WHERE WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO CURB SOVIET EXPANSIONISM.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 6 OF 11 SECTO 02002

EXDIS

FOR EAGLEBURGER AND LORD ONLY

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

44. THERE IS ONE CENTRAL FACT THAT DISTINGUISHES OUR ERA FROM ALL PREVIOUS

HISTORICAL PERIODS -- THE EXISTENCE OF ENORMOUSLY DESTRUCTIVE WEAPONS THAT CAN SPAN UNLIMITED DISTANCES ALMOST INSTANTANEOUSLY. NO PART OF THE GLOBE IS BEYOND REACH. NO PART OF THE GLOBE WOULD BE SPARED IN A GENERAL NUCLEAR EXCHANGE.

45. FOR CENTURIES IT WAS AXIOMATIC THAT INCREASES IN MILITARY POWER COULD BE TRANSLATED INTO ALMOST IMMEDIATE POLITICAL ADVANTAGE. IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT NEW INCREMENTS OF STRATEGIC WEAPONRY DO NOT AUTOMATICALLY LEAD TO EITHER POLITICAL OR MILITARY GAINS. YE, IN THE NATURE OF THINGS, IF ONE SIDE EXPANDS ITS STRATEGIC ARSENAL, THE OTHER SIDE WILL INEVITABLY MATCH IT. THE RACE IS MAINTAINED PARTLY BECAUSE A PERCEIVED INEQUALITY IS CONSIDERED BY EACH SIDE AS POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE EVEN THOUGH IT HAS BECOME DIFFICULT TO DEFINE PRECISELY WHAT PURELY MILITARY PURPOSE IS SERVED.

46. WE THUS FACE A PARADOX: AT CURRENT AND FORESEEABLE LEVELS OF NUCLEAR ARMS, IT BECOMES INCREASINGLY DANGEROUS TO INVOKE THEM. IN NO CRISIS SINCE 1962 HAVE THE STRATEGIC WEAPONS OF THE TWO SIDES DETERMINED THE OUTCOME. TODAY THESE ARSENALS INCREASE-
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INGLY FIND THEIR PURPOSE ONLY IN MATCHING AND DETERRING THE FORCES OF

THE OPPONENT. FOR UNDER NO FORESEEABLE CIRCUMSTANCE COULD THE UNITED STATES -- OR THE SOVIET UNION -- AVOID 100 MILLION DEAD IN A NUCLEAR EXCHANGE. YET THE RACE GOES ON BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY OF FINDING A WAY TO GET OFF THE TREADMILL.

47. TO BE SURE, THERE EXIST SCENARIOS IN PLANNING PAPERS WHICH SEEK TO DEMONSTRATE HOW ONE SIDE COULD USE ITS STRATEGIC FORCES AND HOW IN SOME PRESUMED CIRCUMSTANCE IT WOULD PREVAIL. BUT THESE CONFUSE WHAT A TECHNICIAN CAN CALCULATE WITH WHAT A RESPONSIBLE STATESMAN CAN DECIDE. THEY ARE INVARIABLY BASED ON ASSUMPTIONS SUCH AS THAT ONE SIDE WOULD PERMIT ITS MISSILE SILOS TO BE DESTROYED WITHOUT LAUNCHING ITS MISSILES BEFORE THEY ARE ACTUALLY HIT -- ON WHICH NO AGGRESSOR WOULD RELY WHERE FORCES SUCH AS THOSE POSSESSED BY EITHER THE U.S. OR THE USSR NOW AND IN THE YEARS AHEAD ARE INVOLVED.

48. THIS CONDITION IMPOSES A UNIQUE AND HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY ON THE LEADERS OF THE TWO NUCLEAR SUPERPOWERS. SUSTAINING THE NUCLEAR COMPETITION REQUIRES ENDLESS INVOCATIONS OF THEORETICAL SCENARIOS OF IMMINENT OR EVENTUAL NUCLEAR ATTACK. THE ATTEMPT TO HEDGE AGAINST ALL CONCEIVABLE CONTINGENCIES, NO MATTER HOW FANCIFUL FEELS POLITICAL TENSIONS AND HAS A POTENTIAL OF LEADING TO A SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY. THE FIXATION ON POTENTIAL STRATEGIC ARMS IMBALANCES INHERENT IN AN UNRESTRAINED ARMS RACE DIVERTS RESOURCES INTO STRATEGICALLY UNPRODUCTIVE AREAS -- PARTICULARLY AWAY FROM FORCES FOR LOCAL DEFENSE WHERE SHORTFALLS AND IMBALANCES COULD INDEED BE TURNED RAPIDLY TO OUR DISADVANTAGE. IF NO RESTRAINT IS DEVELOPED, THE COMPETITION IN STRATEGIC ARMS CAN HAVE PROFOUND CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND INDEED OF CIVILIZATION.

49. THE UNITED STATES, THEREFORE, HAS SOUGHT AND ACHIEVED, SINCE 1963, A SERIES OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WHICH BUILD SOME RESTRAINT INTO NUCLEAR RIVALRY. THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT BREAKTHROUGH TO LIMIT STRATEGIC WEAPONS IN 1972. IF THE 1974 VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD LEADS TO A NEW AGREEMENT, AN EVEN MORE IMPORTANT ADVANCE WILL HAVE BEEN MADE.

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50. YET, AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE SUBJECTED TO AN AVALANCHE OF CHARGES THAT SALT IS A SURRENDER OF AMERICAN INTERESTS. THERE ARE ASSERTIONS THAT THE UNITED STATES IS FALLING BEHIND IN THE STRATEGIC COMPETITION AND THAT SALT HAS CONTRIBUTED TO IT. THERE ARE UNSUPPORTABLE CHARGES THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE SYSTEMATICALLY VIOLATED THE SALT AGREEMENTS.

58. NONE OF THIS IS ACCURATE.

52. WHAT ARE THE FACTS?

53. FIRST OF ALL, AMERICAN POLICY DECISIONS IN THE 1960'S SET THE LEVEL OF OUR STRATEGIC FORCES FOR THE 1970'S. WE THEN HAD THE CHOICE BETWEEN TWO LANDBASED WEAPONS, A LARGE, HEAVY THROWWEIGHT

MISSILE CALLED TITAN AND A SMALLER MORE FLEXIBLE WEAPONS CALLED MINUTEMAN OR VARIOUS COMBINATIONS. THE ADMINISTRATION THEN IN OFFICE CHOSE TO RELY ENTIRELY ON AN ARSENAL OF 1000 SMALL, SOPHISTICATED AND HIGHLY ACCURATE ICBM'S AND 656 SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILES ON 41 BOATS, ALONG WITH HEAVY BOMBERS; WE DEPLOYED THEM RAPIDLY, AND THEN STOPPED OUR BUILD-UP OF LAUNCHERS UNILATERALLY IN THE 1960'S WHEN THE PROGRAMS WERE COMPLETE. THE SOVIETS MADE THE OPPOSITE DECISION; THEY CHOSE LARGER, HEAVIER MISSILES; THEY CONTINUED TO BUILD UP THEIR FORCES THROUGH THE 1960'S AND 1970'S; THEY PASSED OUR NUMERICAL LEVELS BY 1969-1970, AND CONTINUED TO ADD AN AVERAGE OF 200 MISSILES A YEAR UNTIL STOPPED BY THE FIRST SALT AGREEMENT.

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FOR EAGLEBURGER AND LORD ONLY

54. THUS, AS A CONSEQUENCE OF DECISIONS MADE A DECADE AGO BY BOTH SIDES, SOVIET MISSILES ARE SUPERIOR IN THROWWEIGHT WHILE OURS ARE SUPERIOR IN RELIABILITY, ACCURACY, DIVERSITY AND SOPHISTICATION, AND WE POSSESS LARGER NUMBERS OF WARHEADS. IN 1972 WHEN THE SALT AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED THE SOVIET UNION WAS STILL BUILDING AT THE RATE OF 90 LAND-BASED LAUNCHERS A YEAR WHILE WE WERE BUILDING NONE AS A RESULT OF OUR OWN REPEATEDLY REAFFIRMED UNILATERAL DECISIONS OF A DECADE PREVIOUSLY. SINCE NEW AMERICAN PROGRAMS TO REDRESS THE BALANCE EXISTED ONLY ON THE DRAWING BOARDS, THERE WAS NO WAY TO REDUCE THE NUMERICAL GAP BEFORE 1977 WHEN MORE MODERN SEA-BASED MISSILES AND BOMBERS WERE SCHEDULED TO BECOME OPERATIONAL.

55. THE INTERIM SALT AGREEMENT OF 1972 FROZE OVERALL NUMBERS OF LAUNCHERS ON BOTH SIDES FOR FIVE YEARS -- THEREBY LIMITING THE MOMENTUM OF SOVIET PROGRAMS WITHOUT AFFECTING ANY AMERICAN ONES. IT STOPPED THE SOVIET BUILD-UP OF HEAVY MISSILE LAUNCHERS. IT FORCED THE SOVIETS TO DISMANTLE 210 OLDER LAND-BASED MISSILES TO REACH PERMITTED CEILINGS ON MISSILE CARRYING SUBMARINES. THE AGREED-UPON SILO LIMITATIONS PERMITTED US TO INCREASE THE THROWWEIGHT OF OUR OWN MISSILES, IF WE DECIDED ON THIS AVENUE OF IMPROVING OUR STRATEGIC FORCES. WE HAVE SO FAR CHOSEN NOT TO DO SO ALTHOUGH, THROUGH R & D, RETAINING THE OPTION. BY ANY MEASURE, THE SALT AGREEMENTS PREVENTED THE THEN EVOLVING GAP IN NUMBERS FROM WIDENING

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WHILE ENABLING US TO RETAIN OUR ADVANTAGE IN OTHER CATEGORIES AND EASING THE PROBLEM OF REDRESSING THE BALANCE WHEN NEW PROGRAMS BECAME OPERATIONAL. WHAT NO NEGOTIATION COULD DO IS REVERSE BY DIPLOMACY THE RESULTS OF OUR OWN LONG-STANDING DECISIONS WITH RESPECT TO WEAPONS DESIGN AND DEPLOYMENT.

56. MOREOVER, THE SALT AGREEMENTS ENDED FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD THE PROSPECT OF A DANGEROUS AND UNCERTAIN COMPETITION IN ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE -- A COMPETITION THAT PROMISED NO STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE, BUT POTENTIALLY SERIOUS INSTABILITIES AND THE EXPENDITURE OF VAST SUMS OF MONEY.

57. THE FIRST SALT AGREEMENTS WERE THEREFORE WITHOUT QUESTION IN THE AMERICAN NATIONAL INTEREST. IN THE FIVE-YEAR RESPITE GAINED BY THE 1972 INTERIM AGREEMENT, IT WAS OUR INTENTION TO NEGOTIATE A LONG-TERM PACT ON OFFENSIVE WEAPONS THAT WOULD FIRMLY FIX BOTH SIDES AT AN EQUAL LEVEL ONCE OUR NEW PROGRAMS BECAME OPERATIONAL. THIS IS PRECISELY WHAT PRESIDENT FORD ACHIEVED AT VLADIVOSTOK IN NOVEMBER 1974.

58. IN THIS ACCORD IN PRINCIPLE, BOTH SIDES AGREED ON A CEILING OF 2400 STRATEGIC WEAPONS COVERING STRATEGIC MISSILES AND HEAVY BOMBERS --- BUT NOT COUNTING ANY OF OUR FORWARD-BASED AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES IN EUROPE, OR OUR ALLIES' STRATEGIC WEAPONS, MANY OF WHICH CAN REACH SOVIET SOIL. THE CEILING OF 2400 IS LOWER THAN THE LEVEL THE SOVIET UNION ALREADY HAS REACHED; IT WOULD REQUIRE THE DISMANTLING OF MANY SOVIET WEAPONS WHILE THE PLANNED LEVELS AND COMPOSITION OF OUR FORCES WOULD NOT NEED TO BE REDUCED OR CHANGED. AN EQUAL CEILING OF 1320 WAS PLACED ON NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS WITH MULTIPLE WARHEADS. SOVIET HEAVY MISSILE LAUNCHERS WILL REMAIN FROZEN. THESE LIMITS WOULD CAP THE STRATEGIC COMPETITION IN NUMBERS FOR A 10-YEAR PERIOD, YET PRESERVE ALL THE PROGRAMS WE NEED TO ASSURE DETERRENCE AND STRATEGIC SUFFICIENCY.

59. OBVIOUSLY NO SINGLE AGREEMENT CAN SOLVE EVERY PROBLEM. THIS IS NOT A QUESTION OF LOOPHOLES BUT OF AN EVOLVING TECHNOLOGY WITH RESPECT TO WHICH WE MUST REMAIN VIGILANT. BUT IF WE SUCCEED IN TURNING THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD INTO THE 10-YEAR SALT AGREEMENT NOW BEING NEGOTIATED, WE WILL
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HAVE CROSSED THE THRESHOLD BETWEEN TOTAL, UNRESTRAINED COMPETITION AND THE DIFFICULT BUT PROMISING BEGINNING OF LONG-TERM STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIUM AT LOWER LEVELS OF FORCES. THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE ALREADY AGREED TO TURN TO REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC FORCES IN THE NEXT PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS STARTING IN 1977.

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EXDIS

FOR EAGLEBURGER AND LORD ONLY

60. ONE WOULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT THESE ACCOMPLISHMENTS WOULD SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES. INSTEAD THEY HAVE TRIGGERED A FLOOD OF CHARGES WHICH MISLEAD THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND OUR FRIENDS, GIVE A WRONG IMPRESSION OF IRRESOLUTENESS TO OUR ADVERSARIES AND COMPLICATE THE PROSPECTS FOR A NEW AGREEMENT THAT IS IN THE OVERRIDING NATIONAL INTEREST.

61. NO CHARGE IS MORE IRRESPONSIBLE AND POTENTIALLY MORE DANGEROUS THAN THE ALLEGATION THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS

KNOWINGLY TOLERATED VIOLATIONS OF THE FIRST SALT AGREEMENTS.

62. WHAT ARE THE FACTS? A STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION WAS CREATED BY THE AGREEMENTS OF 1972 PRECISELY TO CONSIDER DISPUTES OR AMBIGUITIES IN IMPLEMENTATION. SUCH INCIDENTS WERE ALMOST CERTAIN TO ARISE IN A FIRST, QUITE LIMITED AGREEMENT BETWEEN LONG-STANDING ADVERSARIES POSSESSING WEAPONS SYSTEMS OF GREAT COMPLEXITY WHOSE GROWTH IS VERIFIED NOT BY SOME NEUTRAL POLICING MECHANISM BUT BY EACH SIDE'S OWN INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS. EVERY QUESTIONABLE ACTIVITY THAT HAS ARISEN HAS BEEN SYSTEMATICALLY ANALYZED BY THIS GOVERNMENT AND CONSIDERED BY THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ADVISORS. WHENEVER ANY QUESTION REMAINED, IT WAS THEN PROMPTLY RAISED WITH THE SOVIETS. ALL INSTRUCTIONS TO THE AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVE ON THE CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION REFLECTED THE UNANIMOUS VIEWS OF ALL U.S. AGENCIES CONCERNED AND THE DATA AND ASSESSMENT PRODUCED JOINTLY

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BY THEM. NO ONE HAD A BIAS IN FAVOR OF ABSOLVING THE SOVIETS -- AN INHERENTLY MALICIOUS CHARGE. NO ONE PREVENTED ALL QUESTIONABLE OR SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITIES FROM BEING RAISED WITH THE SOVIETS. AND NOT ALL THE QUESTIONED ACTIVITIES WERE ON THE SOVIET SIDE.

63. ALL OF THESE ISSUES HAVE BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE SERIOUSLY HANDLED AND DEALT WITH THROUGH A PROCESS THAT HAS PROVED EFFECTIVE. YET IRRESPONSIBLE CHARGES CONTINUE TO LUMP TOGETHER INCIDENTS THAT HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED OR ARE STILL BEING CONSIDERED WITH WILD ALLEGATIONS THAT HAVE NO FOUNDATION. THEY SOMETIMES PUT FORWARD INACCURATE FIGURES AND DATA WHICH OFTEN CAN BE REFUTED ONLY BY DIVULGING SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. YET WITH ALL THE RECENT FLURRY OF ALLEGATIONS NO RECOMMENDATIONS ARE MADE OF WHAT COUNTERMEASURES WE SHOULD TAKE, OR HOW TO ASSESS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ANY GIVEN ALLEGED VIOLATION. WOULD THOSE WHO INACCURATELY ALLEGE VIOLATIONS SIMPLY THROW OVER ALL THE AGREEMENTS, REGARDLESS OF THE BENEFITS THEY PROVIDE TO THE UNITED STATES? WOULD THEY HALT THE NEGOTIATION OF FURTHER AGREEMENTS? WHAT PURPOSE IS SERVED BY LEADING OUR PUBLIC AND THE SOVIET UNION TO BELIEVE -- TOTALLY INCORRECTLY -- THAT THE UNITED STATES IS BLIND TO VIOLATIONS OR THAT ITS GOVERNMENT DELIBERATELY DECEIVES ITS PEOPLE? CAN ANYONE SERIOUSLY BELIEVE THAT THIS ADMINISTRATION WHICH HAS STRENUOUSLY RESISTED COMMUNIST ADVANCES IN EVERY PART OF THE WORLD -- AND IS OFTEN STRONGLY CRITICIZED FOR IT -- WOULD IGNORE SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF A FORMAL AGREEMENT?

64. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THIS ADMINISTRATION WILL NOT TOLERATE VIOLATIONS. IT WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR SOVIET COMPLIANCE METICULOUSLY. IT WILL PURSUE ENERGETICALLY ALL SIGNS OF NON-COMPLIANCE. BUT IT WILL NOT BE DRIVEN BY

DEMAGOGERY TO MAKE FALSE OR HASTY JUDGMENTS. NO VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REPORTED TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL BY ANY DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY CHARGED WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS PROBLEM.

65. AS WE ASSESS SALT WE MUST FACE SQUARELY ONE QUESTION: WHAT IS THE ALTERNATIVE TO THE AGREEMENT WE HAVE AND SEEK? IF THE SALT PROCESS FALTERS, WE MUST CONSIDER WHAT NEW OR ADDITIONAL STRATEGIC PROGRAMS WE WOULD UNDERTAKE, THEIR CONFIDENTIAL

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LIKELY COST, AND ABOVE ALL, THEIR STRATEGIC PURPOSE. AN ACCELERATED STRATEGIC BUILDUP OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS COULD COST AS MUCH AS AN ADDITIONAL 30 BILLION DOLLARS. FAILING A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT, THIS WILL SURELY BE THE PATH WE MUST TRAVEL. IT WOULD BE A TRAGICALLY MISSED OPPORTUNITY. FOR, IN THE PROCESS OF SUCH A BUILD-UP, AND THE ATMOSPHERE IT WOULD ENGENDER, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO RETURN TO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS FOR SOME TIME. TENSIONS ARE LIKELY TO INCREASE; A NEW, HIGHER BASELINE WILL EMERGE FROM WHICH FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD EVENTUALLY HAVE TO BEGIN. AND IN THE END, NEITHER SIDE WILL HAVE GAINED A STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE. AT THE LEAST THEY WILL HAVE WASTED RESOURCES. AT WORST, THEY WILL HAVE INCREASED THE RISKS OF NUCLEAR WAR.

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EXDIS

FOR EAGLEBURGER AND LORD ONLY

66. OF COURSE THE SOVIET UNION MUST PONDER THESE ALTERNATIVES AS WELL. THEIR SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY MUST EQUAL OURS IF THERE IS TO BE AN EQUITABLE AND DURABLE AGREEMENT BASED ON STRICT RECIPROCITY.

67. LET ME SUM UP:

68 AA WE WILL NEVER STAND FOR THE VIOLATION OF A SOLEMN TREATY OR AGREEMENT AND WE WILL REMAIN ALERT.

69. -- WE WILL NEVER TOLERATE A SHIFT IN THE STRATEGIC BALANCE AGAINST US; BY VIOLATIONS OF AGREEMENTS, BY UNSATISFACTORY AGREEMENTS OR BY NEGLECT OF OUR OWN PROGRAMS; WE WILL SPEND WHAT IS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN A STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIUM.

70. -- THE PRESIDENT IS DETERMINED TO PURSUE THE EFFORT TO NEGOTIATE A SANER STRATEGIC BALANCE -- BECAUSE IT IS IN OUR INTEREST, AND BECAUSE WE HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO OUR OWN PEOPLE AND TO WORLD PEACE.

THE SOVIET UNION AND ANGOLA

71. AS THE UNITED STATES STRIVES TO SHAPE A MORE HOPEFUL WORLD, IT CAN NEVER FORGET THAT GLOBAL STABILITY AND SECURITY
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REST UPON AN EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS. IF THE SOVIET UNION IS PERMITTED TO EXPLOIT OPPORTUNITIES ARISING OUT OF LOCAL CONFLICTS BY MILITARY MEANS, THE HOPES WE HAVE FOR PROGRESS TOWARD A MORE PEACEFUL INTERNATIONAL ORDER WILL ULTIMATELY BE UNDERMINED.

72. THIS IS WHY THE SOVIET UNION'S MASSIVE AND UNPRECEDENTED INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF AFRICA WITH NEARLY 200 MILLION DOLLARS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT, ITS ADVISORS, AND ITS TRANSPORT OF THE LARGE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE OF 11,000 CUBAN COMBAT TROOPS MUST BE A MATTER OF URGENT CONCERN.

73. ANGOLA REPRESENTS THE FIRST TIME THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE MOVED MILITARILY AT LONG DISTANCES TO IMPOSE A REGIME OF THEIR CHOICE. IT IS THE FIRST TIME THAT THE U.S. HAS FAILED TO RESPOND TO SOVIET MILITARY MOVES OUTSIDE THE IMMEDIATE SOVIET ORBIT.

AND IT IS THE FIRST TIME THAT CONGRESS HAS HALTED NATIONAL ACTION IN THE MIDDLE OF A CRISIS.

74. WHEN ONE GREAT POWER TIPS THE BALANCE OF FORCES DECISIVELY IN A LOCAL CONFLICT THROUGH ITS MILITARY INTERVENTION-- AND MEETS NO RESISTANCE -- AN OMINOUS PRECEDENT IS SET, OF GRAVE CONSEQUENCE EVEN IF THE INTERVENTION OCCURS IN A SEMINGLY REMOTE AREA. SUCH A PRECEDENT CANNOT BE TOLERATED IF A LASTING EASING OF TENSIONS IS TO BE ACHIEVED. AND IF THE PATTERN IS NOW BROKEN NOW, WE WILL FACE HARDER CHOICES AND HIGHER COSTS IN THE FUTURE.

75. THE UNITED STATES SEEKS NO UNILATERAL GOALS IN ANGOLA: WE HAVE PROPOSED A CEASEFIRE; WITHDRAWAL OF ALL OUTSIDE FORCES--SOVIET, CUBAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN; CESSATION OF FOREIGN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT; INCLUDING THE SUPPLY OF EQUIPMENT; AND NEGOTIATIONS AMONG ALL THREE ANGOLAN FACTIONS. THIS APPROACH HAS THE SUPPORT OF HALF THE NATIONS OF AFRICA.

76. LAST SUMMER AND FALL, TO HALT A DANGEROUSLY ESCALATING SITUATION, THE UNITED STATES PROVIDED FINANCIAL SUPPORT THROUGH AFRICAN FRIENDS TO THOSE IN ANGOLA -- THE LARGE MAJORITY -- WHO SOUGHT TO RESIST SOVIET AND CUBAN DOMINATION. USING THIS AS LEVERAGE, WE UNDERTOOK AN ACTIVE DIPLOMACY TO PROMOTE AN CONFIDENTIAL

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AFRICAN SOLUTION TO AN AFRICAN PROBLEM. WE ACTED QUIETLY, TO AVOID PROVOKING A MAJOR CRISIS AND RAISING ISSUES OF PRESTIGE.

77. AT FIRST, IT WAS FEARED THAT THE SOVIET-BACKED FACTION BECAUSE OF MASSIVE SOVIET AID AND CUBAN MERCENARIES WOULD DOMINATE TOTALLY BY INDEPENDENCE DAY, NOVEMBER 11. OUR ASSISTANCE PREVENTED THAT. AFRICAN DETERMINATION TO OPPOSE SOVIET AND CUBAN INTERVENTION BECAME MORE AND MORE EVIDENT. ON DECEMBER 9, THE PRESIDENT WARNED MOSCOW OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONTINUED MEDDLING AND OFFERED TO COOPERATE IN ENCOURAGING A PEACEFUL OUTCOME. THE SOVIET UNION APPEARED TO HAVE SECOND THOUGHTS. IT HALTED ITS AIRLIFT FROM DECEMBER 9 UNTIL DECEMBER 24.

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EXDIS

FOR EAGLEBURGER AND LORD ONLY

(78) AT THAT POINT, THE IMPACT OF OUR DOMESTIC DEBATE OVER-
WHELMED THE POSSIBILITIES OF DIPLOMACY. IT WAS DEMANDED THAT
WE EXPLAIN PUBLICLY WHY OUR EFFORT WAS IMPORTANT -- AND THEN
OUR EFFORT WAS CUT OFF. AFTER THE SENATE VOTE TO BLOCK FURTHER
AID TO ANGOLA, CUBA MORE THAN DOUBLED ITS FORCES AND SOVIET
MILITARY AID WAS RESUMED ON A LARGE SCALE. THE COOPERATIVENESS
OF SOVIET DIPLOMACY DECLINED. SINCE THEN THE SITUATION HAS
CONTINUED TO DETERIORATE.

(79) AS OUR PUBLIC DISCUSSION CONTINUES, CERTAIN FACTS MUST
BE UNDERSTOOD. THE ANALOGY WITH VIETNAM IS TOTALLY FALSE;
THIS NATION MUST HAVE THE MATURITY TO MAKE ELEMENTARY DISTINC-
TIONS. THE PRESIDENT HAS PLEDGED THAT NO AMERICAN TROOPS OR
ADVISORS WOULD BE SENT TO ANGOLA, AND WE WERE PREPARED TO
ACCEPT LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS TO THAT EFFECT, IN ADDITION TO THE
WAR POWERS ACT WHICH ALREADY EXISTS. WHAT WAS INVOLVED WAS
MODEST ASSISTANCE TO STABILIZE TH LOCAL BALANCE OF FORCES AND
MAKE POSSIBLE A RAPID POLITICAL SETTLEMNT IN COOPERATION WITH
AFRICAN COUNTRIES.

(80) IT IS CHARGED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION ACED COVERTLY,
WITHOUT PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGMENT. THAT IS CORRECT, FOR OUR
PURPOSE WAS TO AVOID AN ESCALATED CONFRONTATION THAT WOULD MAKE
IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIETS TO BACK DOWN, AS WELL AS TO
GIVE THE GREATEST POSSIBLE SCOPE FOR AN AFRICAN SOLUTION.
ANGOLA WAS A CASE WHERE DIPLOMACY WITHOUT LEVERAGE WAS LIKELY TO
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BE IMPOTENT, YET DIRECT MILITARY CONFRONTATION WOULD INVOLVE
NEEDLESS RISKS. THIS IS PRECISELY ONE OF THOSE GREY AREAS WHERE
UNPUBLICIZED METHODS WOULD ENABLE US TO INFLUENCE EVENTS SHORT
OF DIRECT CONFLICT.

(81) AND WE COMPLIED TOTALLY WITH CONGRESS' NEW STANDARD OF
EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CONSULTATION ON SECRET ACTIVITIES.

BETWEEN JULY AND DECEMBER 1975 WE DISCUSSED THE ANGOLAN SITUATION, AND WHAT WE WERE DOING ABOUT IT, WITH MORE THAN TWO DOZEN SENATORS, 150 CONGRESSMEN, AND OVER 100 STAFF MEMBERS OF BOTH HOUSES. EIGHT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES WERE BRIEFED ON 24 SEPARATE OCCASIONS. WE SOUGHT IN THESE BRIEFINGS TO DETERMINE THE WISHES OF CONGRESS, AND THERE WAS LITTLE SIGN OF ECTIVE OPPOSITION TO OUR CAREFULLY-LIMITED OPERATIONS.

(82) IT IS SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL INEVITABLY BE EASED OUT BY THE AFRICANS THEMSELVES OVER A PERIOD OF TIME. THIS MAY OR MAY NOT PROVE TRUE. BUT SUCH AN ARGUMENT, WHEN CARRIED TO ITS LOGICAL CONCLUSION, IMPLIES THAT WE CAN ABANDON THE WORLD TO INTERVENTIONIST FORCES, AND HOPE FOR THE BEST. AND RELIANCE ON HISTORY IS OF LITTLE SOLACE TO THOSE UNDER ATTACK, WHOSE FUTURE IS BEING DECIDED NOW. THE DEGREE OF SOVIE AND CUBAN INTERVENTION IS UNPRECEDENTED; THEY WILL HAVE EFFECTIVELY DETERMINED THE OUTCOME. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CLAIM THAT THY WILL BE QUICKLY REMOVED OR THAT OTHER NATIONS MAY NOT DRAW DAMAGING CONCLUSIONS DANGEROUS TO OUR LONG-TERM INTERESTS.

(83) IT IS MAINTAINED THAT WE SHOULD MEET THE SOVIET THREAT IN ANGOLA THROUGH ESCALATED METHODS OF PRESSURE SUCH AS ALTERING OUR POSITION ON SALT, OR GRAIN SALES. BUT THESE ARRANGEMENTS BENEFIT US AS WELL AS THE SOVIET UNION. AND HISTORY HAS PROVED TIME AND AGAIN THAT EXPANSION CAN BE CHECKED ONLY WHEN THERE IS A LOCAL BALANCE OF FORCES, INDIRECT MEANS CAN SUCCEED ONLY IF RAPID LOCAL VICTORIES ARE FORECLOSED. AS THE PRESIDENT HAS POINTED OUT, THE SOVIET UNION HAS SURVIVED FOR NEERLY SIXTY YEARS WITHOUT AMERICAN GRAIN; IT COULD DO SO NOW. :1CUTTING OFF GRAIN WOULD STILL LOSE ANGOLA. WE WOULD DUPLICATE THE EXPERIENCE OF THE TRADE ACT, WHICH CUT OFF THE TRADE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR TO ENSURE EMIGRATION -- AND ENDED UP WITH NEITHER.

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(84) LET US NOT BEMUSE OURSELVES WITH FACILE SLOGANS ABOUT NOT BECOMING THE WORLD'S POLICEMAN. WE HAVE NO DESIRE TO PLAY SUCH A ROLE. BUT IT CAN NEVER BE IN OUR INTEREST TO HAVE THE SOVIET UNION ACT AS THE WORLD'S POLICEMAN. THERE ARE MANY CRISES IN THE WORLD WHERE THE UNITED STATES CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT INTERVENE. BUT HERE WE FACE A BLATANT SOVIET AND CUBAN CHALLENGE, WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN OVERCOME IF WE HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO ACT PRUDENLY WITH LIMITED MEANS AT THE EARLY STAGE. BY FORCING THIS OUT ONTO CENTER STAGE, OUR DIVISIONS SIMULTANGEOUSLY ESCALATED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CRISIS AND GUARANTEED OUR IMPOTENCE.

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EXDIS

FOR EAGLEBURGER AND LORD ONLY

85. TO CLAIM THAT ANGOLA IS NOT AN IMPORTANT COUNTRY, OR THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS NO IMPORTANT INTERESTS THERE, BEGS THE PRINCIPAL QUESTION. IF THE UNITED STATES IS SEEN TO WAIVER IN THE FACE OF MASSIVE SOVIET AND CUBAN INTERVENTION, WHAT WILL BE THE PERCEPTION OF LEADERS AROUND THE WORLD AS THHY MAKE DECISIONS CONCERNING THEIR FUTURE SECURITY? AND WHAT CONCLUSIONS WILL AN UNOPPOSED SUPERPOWER DRAW WHEN THE NEXT OPOORTUNITY FOR INTERVENTION BECKONS?

86. WHERE ARE WE NOW? THIS GOVERNMENT HAS A DUTY TO MAKE CLEAR IN THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA THAT ANGOLA SETS NO PRECEDENT, THAT THIS TYPE OF ACTION WILL NOT BE TOLERATED AGAIN. CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE MUST COME TOGETHER -- IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND IN THE INTEREST OF WORLD PEACE.

87. THE ADMINISTRATION WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE THIS CASE HOWEVER UNPOPULAR IT MAY BE TEMPORARILY. LET NO NATION BELIEVE THAT AMERICANS WILL LONG REMAIN INDIFFERENT TO THE DISPATCH OF EXPEDITIONARY FORCES AND VAST SUPPLIES OF ARMS TO IMPOSE MINORITY GOVERNMENTS -- ESPECIALLY WHEN THAT EXPEDITIONARY FORCE COMES FROM A NATION IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.

NATIONAL STRENNGTH AND THE DEBATE AT HOME

88. WE LIVE IN A WORLD WITHOUT SIMPLE ANSWERS. WE HOLD
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OUR VALUES TOO DEAR TO RELINQUISH DEFENDING THEM; WE HOLD HUMAN LIFE TOO DEAR TO CEASE THE QUEST FOR A SECURE PEACE. THE FIRST REQUIREMENT OF STABILITY IS TO MAINTAIN OUR DEFENSES AND THE BALANCE OF POWER. BUT THE HIGHEST AIM OF POLICY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE MUST BE TO CREATE OUT OF THE STERIL EQUILIBRIUM OF FORCE A MORE POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP OF PEACE.

89. AMERICA HAS THE MATERIAL ASSETS TO DO THE JOB. OUR MILITARY MIGHT IS UNMATCHED. OUR ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL STRENGTH DRAWS ANY OTHER. OUR DEMOCRATIC HERITAGE IS ENVIED BY HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS AROUND THE WORLD.

90. OUR PROBLEMS THEREFORE ARE OF OUR OWN MAKING -- SELF-DOUBT, DIVISION, IRRESOLUTION. WE MUST ONCE AGAIN BECOME A CONFIDENT, UNITED AND DETERMINED PEOPLE.

91. FOREIGN COUNTRIES MUST BE ABLE TO DEAL WITH AMERICA AS AN ENTITY, NOT AS A COMPLEX OF DIVIDED INSTITUTIONS. IF OUR DIVISIONS PARALYZE OUR INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS, IT IS AMERICA AS A WHOLE THAT WILL SUFFER. WE HAVE NO MORE URGENT TASK THAN RESTORING THE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, THE CONGRESS, AND THE EXECUTIVE. A NEW PARTNERSHIP CAN ENABLE THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, IN HIS CONSTITUTIONALLY- DETERMINED

ROLE, TO ADDRESS THE WORLD WITH THE CENTRAL AUTHORITY OF THE SPOKESMAN OF A UNITED AND PURPOSEFUL AMERICA.

92. DEBATE IS THE ESSENCE OF DEMOCRACY. BUT RESTRAINT IS THE CEMENT OF NATIONAL COHESION. IT IS TIME TO END THE SELF-TORMENT AND OBSESSION WITH OUR GUILT WHICH HAS THREATENED TO PARALYZE US FOR TOO MANY YEARS. IT IS TIME TO STOP DISMANTLING OUR NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND UNDERMINING OUR NATIONAL CONFIDENCE.

93. LET US LEARN -- EVEN IN A ELECTION YEAR -- THE SELF-DISCIPLINE TO SHAPE OUR DOMESTIC DEBATES INTO A POSITIVE, NOT A DESTRUCTIVE PROCESS.

94. ONE OF THE FORGOTTEN TRUTHS OF OUR HISTORY IS THAT OUR FOUNDING FATHERS WERE MEN OF GREAT SOPHISTICATION IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THEY UNDERSTOOD THE BALANCE OF POWER; THEY MADE USE OF THE DIVISIONS OF EUROPE FOR THE ADVANTAGE OF OUR OWN

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REVOLUTION. THEY UNDERSTOOD THE NEED FOR A STRONG EXECUTIVE TO CONDUCT THE NATION'S DIPLOMACY. THEY GRASPED THAT AMERICA REQUIRED ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND MORAL LINKS WITH OTHER NATIONS.

THEY SAW THAT OUR IDEALS WERE UNIVERSAL AND THEY UNDERSTOOD
AND WELCOMED THE IMPACT OF THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT ON THE
DESTINIES OF ALL MANKIND.

95. IN OUR AGE WHOSE CHALLENGES ARE WITHOUT PRECEDENT, WE
NEED ONCE AGAIN THE WISDOM OF OUR FOUNDING FATHERS. OUR
IDEALS MUST GIVE US STRENGTH -- RATHER THAN SERVE AS AN
EXCUSE FOR ABDICATION. OUR PRAGMATIC TRADITION MUST HELP
US UNDERSTAND REALITY AND SHAPE IT, RATHER THAN BE DIVERTED BY
AN OBSESSION WITH TECHNICAL DETAIL OR METHOD WITHOUT PURPOSE.
OUR LOVE OF OUR COUNTRY MUST INSPIRE US TO PERSEVERE WITH
DEDICATION AND UNITY AND NOT TO CONSUME OUR SUBSTANCE IN CIVIL
STRIFE. OUR IDEALISM SHOULD REMIND US THAT WE REMAIN THE
BEACON OF HOPE FOR ALL THOSE WHO LOVE LIBERTY AND THAT THIS
IMPOSES A HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY ON US.

96. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WANT AN EFFECTIVE FOREIGN POLICY. THEY
WANT AMERICA TO CONTINUE TO HELP SHAPE THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER
OF THE COMING GENERATION ACCORDING TO OUR IDEALS. WE HAVE
DONE GREAT THINGS AS A UNITED PEOPLE. WE HAVE IT IN OUR
POWER TO MAKE OUR THIRD CENTURY A TIME OF VIBRANCY AND HOPE
AND GREATNESS.
KISSINGER

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Message Attributes

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Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
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Disposition Case Number: n/a
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